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In this position paper, we discuss the need for, and potential require-
ments for privacy certification standards for extended-reality devices
and related services. We begin by presenting motivations, before
discussing related efforts. We then review the issue of certification
as a research problem and identify key requirements. Finally, we out-
line key recommendations for how these might feed into a grander
roadmap for privacy and security research.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Personal data has become a valuable commodity for tech companies
in recent years. It is becoming increasingly challenging for data sub-
jects (individuals whose data exist on digital systems) to understand
how software and hardware services process their data, and trust that
it is treated according to what has been consented. These challenges
spans a wide range of devices such as phones, TVs, home assistants,
smart energy monitors and many more devices and services.
The disconnect between understanding the myriad of ways in
which devices operate and how applications collect data across
developers, data subjects and legal teams means that the implemen-
tation or services may not sufficiently reflect the intentions of the
developer, company or data subjects. There is likely to be nuanced
data and processes that has not been captured suitably, simply be-
cause business models, policies and practices are decoupled from the
implementation. Software and hardware bugs may also be present
that result in data exposure for which there is means to protect data
subjects.
As new software and hardware becomes available, in particular:
Extended-Reality (XR) devices, we argue that it will be necessary
to re-think what concepts such as privacy and trust are in this space,
and what they can and should be. In the context of XR, it is possible
to now collect a variety of new data types, including observed or
inferred bio-metric data about users, real-scene information (and
relate this to other data sources). Some examples of this type of data
can include gait, eye or head movements, body appearance, domicile
information, heart rate, inferred emotional states and potentially
many more. Domicile data for instance, may include a record of
household objects to build a psychological profile about individuals.
In order to improve trust and understanding between end-users,
data subjects and companies, and ensure that personal data will
be processed as expected, we postulate it is necessary to develop
a privacy model that developers can adhere to regardless if their
XR device or service. This could take the form of an XR privacy
certification standard that developers comply with to improve se-
curity, privacy, and ethics in the products and platforms they build.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate and outline what such an
approach might look like. The key research question we explore
in this paper is therefore: What requirements ought to exist for




Applying for any type of certification is often voluntary, but compa-
nies are encouraged to demonstrate compliance to specific standards,
either by regulators, collaborators or even competitors in the interest
of a healthy industry. Compliance means that stakeholders have
assurances that a company or product will behave according to spec-
ification and that the specification is in part guided by a reference
(i.e. standard). To the best of our knowledge, there is no privacy
certification standard that exists specific to XR devices and services,
however, a significant body of work exists is moving in that direc-
tion. We outline key efforts towards establishing privacy in systems.
ISO 27701 for instance is a standard for Privacy Information Man-
agement1. It is a privacy extension to ISO/IEC 27001 Information
Security Management and ISO/IEC 27002 Security Controls, and
provides guidance on the protection of privacy.
Privacy-by-design is a set of seven key principles aimed at re-
specting privacy in a system’s design [2]. The Privacy Management
Reference Model (PMRM) [3] is a methodology for understanding
and analysing privacy policies and their privacy management require-
ments in defined use cases. The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) [1] discuss the concepts of privacy engineering
and risk management for federal systems and aims to establish the
basis for a common vocabulary to better facilitate understanding and
communication of privacy risk within federal systems. MITRE’s Pri-
vacy Engineering Framework [7] outlines how privacy engineering
activities map to stages of a system’s engineering life cycle.
The XR Safety Initiative2 is in process of establishing a standard
approach to communicating any data/resource stewardship, policy-
based, regulatory, contractual and financial obligations related to the
access to and use of XR technologies. An important aspect of this is
privacy.
Emami-Naeini et al. [4] interviewed a group of security and
privacy experts, and have proposed as set of security and privacy
labels for IoT devices. The purpose of this is to enable users to
understand how their data will be used in a standardised form. A
similar approach to communicating what privacy standards can apply
to XR systems could be beneficial to XR users.
Happa et al. [6] make the assumption it is impossible to identify
all ethical and legal issues that can emerge from IoT research, and
propose that through aggressive peer-review of conceivable data
processing and decision-making in novel technologies, it is possible
to tackle ethical and legislative concerns proactively and reactively
in more well-informed ways. Such a methodology could be applied
within an XR privacy context as well.
Our previous work [5] outlined key cyber security challenges
posed to Collaborative Mixed-Reality (CMR) systems, including
threat detection and possible harms from actuated threats in mixed-
reality systems. We use this work as well as the aforementioned work
as a starting point for our research into proposing key requirements
for XR privacy-certification standards.
3 KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR RESEARCH
When identifying key requirements for any XR privacy-certification
scheme, several concerns may not be immediately apparent, partly
because companies and users do not fully explore the scope of
1https://www.iso.org/standard/71670.html
2https://xrsi.org/
potential harm that may arise from XR privacy misuse prior to
deployment. This is in part because most evidence is anecdotal, and
very little has been demonstrated empirically and experimentally.
Given the complexity of the amount, and types of personal data that
can be collected or inferred, it is difficult for data subjects to be able
to really give (fully) informed consent in order to use these devices
and access associated services. From the perspective of certification
standards, for XR devices and services, we believe there are at least
six important issues that need consideration:
• Keeping privacy and security a priority. Data subjects, espe-
cially end-users need to trust that a company will prioritise privacy
of the data subjects for which they retain data – ideally this is core
to their business model. This includes ensuring that protection
mechanisms (security) are suitably applied and updated to the
needs of the data subject.
• Acting with data subjects’ best interests in mind. Companies
will behave both legally and ethically responsible when changing
their usage licenses, products and services. This is challenging if
data subject and company interests are diametrically opposed.
• Ability to monitor/audit personal data within systems. Devel-
opers and legal teams need to be able to properly capture (and
secure) the full scope of how personal data trails can be used.
• Lack of transparency in first party system. Data processing is
opaque to data subjects, making it difficult to have confidence in
that technology companies have their users best interests at heart.
• Ability to understand how personal data can interact with
third-party systems. Devices and services may be provided by
different companies, and can be misused by third-party actors.
• Disconnect between legal documents and implementation. Us-
age policy documents are written by legal teams, and not devel-
opers whose understanding of a systems is likely to be detached
from the actual implementation.
End users rely on privacy polices in end-user licence agreements
to use most devices or services and most people cannot (or have
the time to) study, disassemble and monitor how their devices or
services process their data. In fact, they often have to blindly trust
that their devices and service providers will act according to the
polices specified. In terms of trust, users may initially trust device
and service providers, however usage licenses change and companies
can choose to change they way in which they monetise the data
and data trails they collect. They may also not fully understand
the scope of the system in play, and thus make a well-informed
decision w.r.t. consent. One scenario that is problematic is the
inevitable “multi-app future”3, in which users may wish to bring
in their own apps (e.g. own virtual camera, virtual applications,
etc.) into someone else’s “environment”. Driver chains for instance
can be beneficial for accessibility, but unmoderated and insecure
systems can be compromised by particularly motivated adversaries.
Finally, there is also the usual problem of certification of applications,
specifically graphics drivers (which are fragile), and overlaying apps
(similar to smartphone phone grabbing permissions), present their
own sets of security concerns.
4 KEY REQUIREMENTS FOR A ROADMAP
Below follows some initial suggestions for requirements to feed into
a roadmap. We believe this list should be considered a starting point,
rather than an exhaustive list:
• Vocabulary. A vocabulary to meaningfully communicate infor-
mation about data subjects, their data and stakeholders may be-
come necessary. For XR devices and services, we argue that it
will be necessary to re-define privacy threats and concerns, with
3https://www.khronos.org/news/permalink/
multi-app-the-next-evolution-in-spatial-computing
XR devices and services in mind. Such a system will require a
much wider view of social and technical harms and how to protect
users from those harms.
• Establishment of an interdisciplinary consortium in order to
exhaustively capture, categorise and discuss privacy threats in XR.
• Tools to forensically examine cyber attacks specific to XR de-
vices and services. This may be achieved using a shared, peer-
reviewed unified framework that can interface with a wide ar-
ray of XR devices and services. Security analysts make use of
technology-centric solutions to detect and combat threats posed
to digital infrastructures. Present day Intrusion Detection and
Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) for instance aim to identify and
limit misuse or anomalies from actuating into real-world harms.
These systems have not been built with XR needs in mind. While,
technology-centric tools will always remain important, no existing
system is able to capture, take into account, mitigate or respond
to social-level harms such as reputation, identify theft or mental
health. We believe socio-technical threat detection systems will
likely become vital in the future of XR.
• Establish practices to identify and mitigate third-party mis-
use. Any auditing tools, ought to also be able to monitor for
misuse by trusted third parties. To what degree should these be
available to all stakeholders remains an open question, but we
suspect that any secure system should also allow, encourage and
empower all parties to try and find misuse of their data using
open-source and easy to use tools.
• Development of privacy benchmarks to be met in order to be
certified. When monitoring for tampering, leaks or other attacks –
an XR device attestation method or external auditing tool could
output logs to e.g. an JSON schema format, either for research
settings or production environments. We might be able to answer
questions like: does the XR device meet a benchmark we have
specified – if yes, this will be because we have the empirical or
experimental evidence to demonstrate that.
5 CONCLUSION
We believe that a special interest group ought to be established to
further refine privacy requirements for XR devices and services,
and propose recommendations for a privacy certification scheme,
particularly exploring how one might be implemented, whether tiers
(of compliance) could exist for privacy models, which may lead to a
formal specification, which can be met and tested by companies and
data subjects.
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